Iowa Science Teachers Journal
Volume 23

Number 2

Article 2

1986

The Nature of Science as a Model for Teaching for
Conceptualization
Robert W. Hanson
University of Northern Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/istj
Part of the Science and Mathematics Education Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you
Copyright © Copyright 1986 by the Iowa Academy of Science
Recommended Citation
Hanson, Robert W. (1986) "The Nature of Science as a Model for Teaching for Conceptualization," Iowa
Science Teachers Journal: Vol. 23 : No. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/istj/vol23/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa Academy of Science at UNI ScholarWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Iowa Science Teachers Journal by an authorized editor of UNI ScholarWorks. For
more information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu.

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE AS A MODEL FOR
TEACHING FOR CONCEPTUALIZATION
Robert.W Hanson
Late Professor of Chemistry
and Science Education
University of Northern Iowa
Cedar Falls, Iowa 50614
Many teachers of methods courses for future secondary science teachers
probably share my observation that high marks in conventional college science
courses do not always indicate a good grasp of how science has developed as a
human enterprise. In spite of efforts of curriculum developers and vast expenditures of public funds to improve science teaching in our secondary schools, the
typical science background of a beginning teacher consists of a body of content
with traditional disciplinary boundaries created by departments that view science
in terms of their own specialized subject matter. Little emphasis is given to a
broad view of science as a human enterprise, and typical novice teachers go out
to teach the subject matter they recognize as physics, chemistry, biology or
earth science. The broader objectives of science are frequently overlooked.
Many science curricula have been based on the idea that the exponential
growth of scientific knowledge guarantees the obsolescence of the subject
matter commonly taught, and have tried to select certain "big ideas" in science
that are more likely to have long-range applicability. The National Science
Teachers Association (NSTA) went a bit further in identifying a set of major
conceptual schemes and major items in the process of science that might serve
as the basis for science curriculum planning, K-12 (NSTA Curriculum Committee, 1964). Another publication of NSTA, addressing itself to the junior high
school specifically, admitted that "When teachers, supervisors and administrators turn to those who should be in a position to help them, . . . they find even
the theoretical structure in dissarray," but proposed an "engineering" approach
to curriculum development, quite apart from "the simpler problems engineered
by the psychologist in the laboratory" (Brandwein, 1967). That paper emphasized that curricular structure should "be responsive to the stable aspects of
science, its structure of orderly explanation, that is, its conceptual structure.
Just as orderly explanation is the central product of science, so is concept
attainment central to understanding the way the world works. Concept attainment is central to seeking the correspondence of thought with the 'real' world
(the testable world)."
Paul de H. Hurd (1969) emphasized concept formation in modern curriculum
theory and attempted to define the meaning of "concept" and its relation to
"facts." These much-used terms, so central to modern curricular theory, require
clear understanding not just careful definition. Hurd admitted that the term
"concept" is not given the same meaning in science as in psychology, nor does the
word have the same meaning in all school subjects. It is not surprising then, that
pre-service teachers do not have a firm grasp of the meaning of this all-important
term in the teaching of science, considering the variety of meanings attributed to
it by instructors in education, psychology, social studies and science.
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Hurd relates the meaning of "concept" to "facts" at one extreme and to
"theories" at the other extreme, referring to the latter as essentially the same as
"conceptual schemes. " An understanding of what is meant by a "fact" is essential
to the full comprehension of the meaning of "concept" and "conceptual scheme,"
and it is here that another gap prevails, even though Hurd does say simply that
"facts are essentially bits of information" and that "facts are available to all who
perceive them; they are public property, whereas concepts are a private
possession and represent a personal grasp of the relatedness of data." At
another point, Hurd (1969) refers to facts as the findings of science, the "bricks"
of the architecture to scientific knowledge, and generally seems to view facts as
the observations and data that, to be useful, must be brought together as parts of
verifiable concepts.
These statements, whose meaning depend so much on one's interpretation of
a "fact," leave the definition of "concept" unclear. Conant's definition calls for the
use of two criteria to identify scientifu facts: "(1) a fact must be directly
observable, and (2) a fact must be demonstrable at any time" (Collette, 1973).
Collette, like Hurd, seems to equate "facts" with "observations."
As we try to develop a model of the nature of science useful in planning an
effective means of teaching science, let us think about the growth of scientific
knowledge, the expanding frontier, what humankind has become aware of, and
beyond that - what humankind is not yet aware of. Are there "facts" in the
apparently infinite universe of which humankind is not yet aware?
The answer must be "yes. " We have only to look back a few centuries to see
that humankind has recently become aware of much in the universe. For
example, was it not a fact that the planet Pluto existed long before any
astronomer became aware of its existence? In the same sense, are there not
facts in the universe of which humankind is not yet aware?
The answer is obviously in the affirmative, or science as we know it would
have no meaning. Science, as a complex of intellectual activities, defies definition
in a few words, but it can be said quite simply that the scientist tries to bring
order to relevant facts. Hurd summed it up well: "Science is an intellectual
activity which arises from personal experience and takes place in the minds of
men" (Collette, 1973). Whether humans will ever be aware of all the facts of the
universe is a purely philosophical question dealing with "ultimate truth." The
uncertainty of this question is responsible for the tentative nature of scientific
statements and the incompleteness of the scientific enterprise. The novice
science teachers' lack of awareness of this incompleteness tends to perpetuate
the teaching of science as dogma and the failure to emphasize its revisionary
character. Few teachers, experienced ones included, deliberately plan lessons to
illustrate science as a dynamic system of changing concepts and theories.
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Many science curricula attempt to call attention to the tentative nature of
scientific theories, and most claim to be based on the development of concepts or
conceptual schemes. However, typical beginning teachers have not been exposed to planned development in their college science courses and have
ordinarily not been given much opportunity to see science as an intellectual
enterprise that continues to grow in the same way that individuals develop
concepts as they encounter new facts in different contexts. They will falter if
asked to define a "fact" and will often be stymied if asked to define "science."
A model that I have found helpful in working with pre-service science teachers
(and some in-service teachers) represents an expanding region of scientific
knowledge within a "universe" of facts. The point of the model is that "facts" may
be considered apart from human awareness of them and may be thought of as
truths, conditions of existence, happenings, interactions, etc., whether they are
susceptible to direct observation or not, and whether they are demonstrable at
any time (using the criteria of Conant). Using letters to represent facts, Figure 1
shows the expanding human understanding of the universe, having somewhat
the appearance of an amoeba moving in one direction and then another to envelop
and assimilate new or known facts in familiar or unfamiliar contexts.

Fact A in a
context yet
unknown

Fact A

Fact A
in another context

t)I]

The "unknown"

O The expanding understanding of the universe
Figure 1
THE UNIVERSE OF FACTS

4

Iowa Science Teachers Journal/Autumn 1986

This model not only represents the growth of human knowledge of the
universe, but the manner in which science as a human enterprise assimilates new
findings, develops concepts of relating facts in various contexts, and ultimately
leads to broad generalizations or conceptual schemes.
The model can also represent the way an individual assimilates new experiences (encounters with facts) into an existing framework of experience. Prior
experience elicits consistent responses to the extent that a given concept, or
mental construct, has developed. This varies from one individual to another and
within the same individual as time goes on. Conceptualization is a process of
classification or categorization; it is made up of habitual tracks of association
developed either deliberately or fortuitously.
This may not be the model of science that is in the public mind nor the model
employed in science teaching. Science is often viewed as a method for solving
problems consisting of a series of steps in an experiment. Scientists try to bring
order to relevant facts and do this as a mental process. Scientists design
experiments for the purpose of gathering more facts. The interpretation of those
facts is a mental process facilitated by the degree of conceptualization previously
developed in the mind of the investigator.
Collette (1973) points out three different theoretical points of view - those of
Gagne, Bruner and Ausubel, and separates Ausubel's point of view as supportive
of the emphasis on the products of learning (facts, concepts, principles, conceptual schemes) as opposed to the processes of learning. Ausubel is also identified as a
"militant adversary" of those supporting discovery learning and a proponent of a
sequentially-organized structure for the presentation of science in the curriculum, as opposed to displaying science as a method of inquiry. Ausubel, according
to Collette, believes that two prerequisites must be met before meaningful
learning can take place:
(1)

students must not learn new material in rote fashion; they must be ready
to use an approach which will result in meaningful learning.

(2) the material to be learned must be substantially relatable to a relevant
cognitive structure and learners must have the necessary content to make
connections between their existing cognitive structure and the new
material.
Figure 2 is another aspect of the model presented in Figure 1 and relates to
these prerequisites of Ausubel. Fact "pt observed in various contexts through a
variety of observations and experiences becomes part of meaningful learning
when it is "conceptualized," that is, when the information becomes more widely
applicable and less dependent on context for understanding. Each concept thus
developed provides a means of understanding and integrating more isolated
facts, and a basis for generalizing, assimilating relevant facts, and rejecting
irrelevant information.
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Ausubel places "meaningful learning'' at one extreme of a continuum with
"rote-learning" at the other extreme. Rote learning involves only superficial
connections between new experiences and the cognitive structure and is easily
·
forgotten.

Fact A understood as a general
principle in many contexts
becomes concept A.

Fact A observed in various
contexts
Concept A (C,J

Assimilation
or
Rejection

relevant

irrelevant

irrelevant
Figure 2
CONCEPTUALIZATION; ASSIMILIATION; REJECTION

Ths model has been found helpful in relating one aspect of the nature of
science to at least one approach to learning theory. It impresses upon inexperienced teachers the importance of their own conceptual development in
congnitive terms as opposed to merely hoping that meaningful learning will occur
in their students if left to themselves in an unstructured "curriculum." The
correspondence of this learning theory with the nature of science and the
development of scientific theories (or conceptual schemes) lends support to this
approach as ·one alternative among several available to the novice teacher.
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